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The decolonization of the pre-war empires—American, Belgian, British, Dutch, French, 
Japanese, and Portuguese—has stimulated an extraordinary range of scholarship on the 
processes of imperial disengagement from the colonies in Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean. 
The scholarship has focused on: (a) the dynamics of nationalist struggle in the colonies; 
(b) the shifting dynamics of policy at the level of the imperial capitals; (c) the role of 
international organizations such as the United Nations (UN) and the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM) in various cases of decolonization; and (d) the ways in which the 
competition between the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and 
the Warsaw Pact and their allies influenced the processes and outcomes of the 
decolonization process. Some of the studies provide detailed explorations of the process 
of decolonization in individual instances, while others seek to synthesize the dynamics of 
decolonization in regional, comparative, and global contexts.
The myriad contexts that shaped the decolonization process, the complexity of issues that 
emerged as the process unfolded, and the proliferation of nationalist sentiment and 
struggles all contributed to the fascination with decolonization and its role in reshaping 
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the international order after 1945. Decolonization marked a phase in the globalization of 
politics that ended the intellectual and political legitimacy of colonial rule and eroded the 
hierarchies of race that underpinned the centuries-old colonial order. In effect, the 
globalization of European imperial projects after 1492 was reversed by the decolonization 
process in the second half of the 20th century.
Decolonization was thus both a response to the globalization of European influence and a 
process of globalization that paved the way for the dismantling of the North Atlantic-
centered international system. It was driven simultaneously by imperatives of imperial 
deconstruction and the constitution/reconstruction of sovereignty in the former colonies. 
However, scholars also need to give greater thought to the ways in which decolonization 
was both reflective of the rise of nationalist sentiment and a process that was larger than 
the relationship between the imperial powers and their respective colonies. Future
scholarship will need to be attentive to the international and transnational dimensions 
of decolonization as a global process. There is much to be said about the ways in which 
the diplomatic initiatives of new nations such as India, Indonesia, and Egypt that 
emerged after 1945 helped to mobilize resources and develop strategies to accelerate 
and expand the opportunities for the decolonization process by way of the United 
Nations, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Commonwealth Group of Nations linking the 
former British colonies, and other multilateral fora. Similarly, the role of the Soviet Union, 
the People's Republic of China, and Cuba in providing military supplies, military advisors, 
and, on occasion, combat units to nationalist movements challenging the colonial powers 
helped to accelerate the decolonization process after 1945. Decolonization was part of 
the shifting terrain of international relations and a factor in the calculus of the global 
balance of power.
In addition, the decolonization process helped to create avenues of political mobilization 
within the imperial centers which opened opportunities for coalitions supportive of 
decolonization to engage and influence policy at home and in the wider international 
system. In Britain, the Labour Party became a major factor in pushing the process of 
decolonization, while the Communist and Socialist parties played similar roles in France. 
The rise of the American civil rights movement, which challenged the domestic racial 
regime, had a catalytic effect upon the national liberation struggles in various African 
countries. In turn, the rise of independent states in Africa forced American policymakers 
to recognize the paradox of its claim to “leadership of the Free World.” As a consequence, 
the American racial regime became a casualty of the cold war and decolonization after 
1945.  This interactive effect between the struggle for national liberation in colonies 
across the international system and the impetus for social and political change in other 
societies is, perhaps, best represented in the ways in which Gandhi's advocacy of 
nonviolence to challenge both South African race policies and British colonial rule in 
India helped to frame the civil rights struggle in the United States.
The transnational activism that shaped the decolonization process had a “domino effect” 
that required new avenues of collaboration among the colonial powers for policies aimed 
at preventing, slowing, and/or defining the process of decolonization during the cold war. 
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The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was not simply about a mutual security pact that 
provided an American commitment to the defense of Western Europe—it was also a 
mechanism used to develop coordinated strategies for dealing with the decolonization 
process in the non-European world. In the 1950s, America helped France contain the 
communist insurgency in Vietnam as a way to maintain a French commitment to the 
containment of the Soviet Union in Europe. Similarly, America premised its support for 
the Portuguese colonies in Southern Africa on the need to maintain access to military 
bases in the Azores for American military oper- ations within the NATO alliance. NATO 
represented an alliance of the European colonial powers with the United States that 
influenced the process of decolonization after 1945. As a consequence NATO, as one of 
the major alliance systems in the cold war, became a vehicle for the expansion of 
America's “informal empire” on the global stage and symbolized the Western Alliance's 
commitment to maintaining the politics of racial supremacy that had underpinned the 
pre-1945 global order.
The successful Japanese military and ideological assault on the European and 
American imperial holdings in Asia during World War II seriously discredited the 
legitimacy of colonialism. The Japanese military successes in the Asia-Pacific region 
during the war exposed the vulnerabilities of Western colonial rule and created the 
political space for the rise of nationalism in Asia.  As the Asian power that demonstrated 
its immunity to the spread of European imperial rule in the nineteenth century, Japan 
became an independent industrial and military power capable of defeating Russia in the 
1905 Russo-Japanese War. Japan also established its own colonies in Korea, Taiwan, and 
in mainland China. Japan in the early 20th century became a symbol of Asian 
modernization and industrialization that could withstand European imperial ambitions.
If Japan's success provided an alternative vision to Western imperial rule, it was the 
genocidal tragedies unleashed by Nazi Germany in Europe that shattered the idea of 
Western imperial rule as sustainable. The Nazi regime demonstrated through genocide 
the ultimate logic of Western civilization's politics and ideology of racial supremacy. All 
the colonial powers, including the Japanese and the United States, had less than stellar 
records in their treatment of their colonial subjects, and Nazi Germany's treatment of the 
Jewish populations of Europe followed the earlier pursuit of genocidal policies against the 
Herero population in its colony in South West Africa. This convergence of the domestic 
and colonial politics of race in the German experience provided powerful insight into the 
dangers of the ideology of racial supremacy. In the wake of World War II, racial 
supremacy was progressively relegated to the margins of serious political debate. The 
complicities of European colonial rule in the non-European world with the trajectory of 
Nazi Germany could not be avoided after 1945.
In effect, the anti-colonial struggle and decolonization were catalysts in the creation of an 
alternative moral universe in which colonial rule was repudiated by its challengers as 
antithetical to the ideas of a global society based upon the principle of human equality. 
The course of decolonization was more than a process of political transformation of 
countries and peoples. It was also a symbol of moral regeneration leading to the birth and 
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reinvigoration of “nations.” Simultaneously, it represented a search for international 
redemption from the historical embrace of the “civilizing mission,” and its corollary, racial 
supremacy, on the part of the colonial powers.  It was this dual thread of the 
decolonization process that helped to fuel and constrain the cold war in the post-1945 
era.
The cold war was driven by the search for a security architecture in Europe that would 
prevent a return to the destabilizing nationalisms that had wracked Europe in the first 
half of the 20th century. The rise of non-European nationalism, however, limited the 
appeal of the major alliances to the emergent nationalist elites. Unless the alliances 
showed themselves disposed to support the challenge to colonial rule by nationalists and 
demonstrated a willingness to distance themselves from the commitment to imperial rule 
by the colonial powers, their claims to leadership within the international system were 
contested. Decolonization represented the search for a new international order in which 
nationalism and ideological pluralism—as opposed to bipolarity—were constituent 
elements. Decolonization was thus project, process, and outcome of the search for a 
replacement for the quest for North Atlantic hegemony that had shaped the 
imperialism that preceded 1945 and the bipolar vision of the leaders of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact that emerged after 1945.
The intersection of the cold war and decolonization produced a sustained engagement 
global in its reach. In the aftermath of World War II, the decolonization of the Philippines, 
followed by the transfer of power from Britain in India, Pakistan, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), and 
Burma, and the Dutch decision to leave Indonesia, were early indications of the 
momentum building for decolonization. However, the US decision to extend its colonial 
possessions by acquiring the Pacific territories that had been held by Japan under the 
League of Nations’ Mandate, and France's decision to reoccupy Indochina and reassert 
its colonial rule, sent an alternative message. When the Chinese Communist party won 
the civil war in 1949, establishing the People's Republic of China (PRC), it became 
evident that the geopolitics of Asia had shifted against the colonial powers. It was also 
evident that the struggle over Asian independence would become a catalyst for the 
expansion of the cold war into Asia. For the United States, the “loss of China” illustrated 
the limits of its strategy of containment directed against the Soviet Union. The creation of 
the PRC extended communist influence into the heart of Asia, confronting America with a 
new challenge. Two of the world's largest states which straddled much of the Eurasian 
landmass were now both communist powers.
The competition for influence in the changing Asian context triggered a military 
confrontation that superimposed the cold war struggle on a civil war on the Korean 
peninsula in 1950. The Korean War provided the venue for the United States and the PRC 
to deploy resources to engage in mutual containment on the Asian mainland as they 
clashed over the future of the former Japanese colony. The war was about both the 
struggle for control over the entire country between the pro-American and pro-
communist nationalist factions and the confrontation between the United States and the 
communist powers in the strategic competition for influence in Asia.  The first large-scale 
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military conflict of the post-1945 era symbolized the integration of the decolonization 
processes into the cold war conflict. The insurgencies in Malaya, the Philippines, and 
Vietnam that emerged during the late 1940s provided further evidence that the politics of 
decolonization and communism were intimately linked at the level of the internal politics 
of the Asian nationalist movements.  Korea signaled the emerging struggle for influence 
among the Western alliance, the Soviet Union, and a resurgent China in the post-1945 
politics of Asia.
Even as the Korean War settled into a protracted military stalemate, the Vietnamese 
insurgency escalated. French military weakness provoked a major crisis. American 
support for the French military effort to defeat the insurgency by the Vietnamese 
communist forces proved to be inadequate. The Eisenhower administration discussed the 
possibility of direct American intervention, but there was little enthusiasm for another 
misadventure on the Asian mainland following Korea. The possibility of the use of 
American nuclear weapons against the Vietnamese communist forces was considered 
briefly but failed to gain traction.  Nevertheless, the issue indicated that the nuclear 
genie unleashed by the cold war in Europe was beginning to influence the calculus of the 
shifting Asian balance of power. The growing realization that the Western powers lacked
the military capacity to win a decisive victory against Chinese military forces and 
Chinese-backed insurgents in countries directly bordering the PRC created the conditions 
for the negotiated settlements and geographical division in both the Korean War and the 
French war in Vietnam. The cold war had become a determinant of the contours of the 
Asian decolonization process and the boundaries of the post-colonial states in Korea and 
Vietnam. Just as important, the divisions among the United States, France, and Great 
Britain that emerged around the issue of the French military failures in Vietnam reflected 
the tensions that decolonization had provoked within the heart of the NATO alliance over 
strategy in both Europe and Asia.
This process involved both the former Japanese colonies and the European colonies 
occupied during the war by Japanese forces. The Japanese conquests of the Philippines, 
Vietnam, Malaya, and Indonesia during World War II had shattered the legitimacy of 
American, French, British, and Dutch colonial rule in each colony. The Americans 
acknowledged independence for the Philippines in 1946. The unsuccessful Dutch 
campaign—with support from the British—to reassert colonial rule in Indonesia led to the 
Hague's acceptance of the independence of its colony in 1949.  The British faced an 
insurgency led by the Communist party in Malaya from 1948 to 1960, which albeit 
unsuccessful, paved the way for Malayan independence under a pro-Western 
government.  For the French, however, imperial disengagement from Vietnam came only 
after a decisive military defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954.  The surrender of Japan in 
1945 had also led to the loss of its pre-war colonial possessions in Taiwan and Korea, 
which resulted in a confrontation between China and the United States over the future of 
these former colonies after the 1949 communist victory in the Chinese civil war. China 
was determined to reassert its sovereignty over Formosa/Taiwan while the United States 
sought to protect the nationalist regime on the island from the consequences of the 
political and military ineptitude of its leaders.  Similarly, the Korean War laid the basis 
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for the escalation of Sino-American tensions over the unresolved status of the former 
Japanese colonies. Thus, the decolonization process in Asia had provoked the imposition 
of cold war tensions in the former colonies of both the European and Japanese empires.
In response to the expansion of the cold war into Asia, the newly independent countries of 
the region sponsored the Bandung Conference of 1955 that sought to create support for 
Asian nationalism and the space for a negotiated end to colonial rule. Signaling that a 
“Colored Curtain” had been drawn against the European alliances in the affairs of the 
non-European world, invitations were extended to the PRC and Japan, but the United 
States, the Soviet Union, and the Western colonial powers were excluded. The conference 
articulated a vision of neutrality that sought to decouple the struggle for decolonization in 
Asia and the non-European world from the cold war. It marked the emergence of the Non-
Aligned Movement as a factor in post-1945 international politics that would complicate 
the efforts of the major alliance systems to consolidate their influence outside of Europe. 
Just as important, the pursuit of neutralism under the umbrella of the NAM by the new 
states stimulated the growth of ideological pluralism that contested the bipolar order that 
defined the North Atlantic region over the course of the cold war. Yet, Bandung 
also represented an early indication that the bipolar system in Europe was less stable 
than it appeared. Yugloslavia's Josip Broz “Tito” proved to be an early harbinger of 
European disaffection with the bipolar order as he became a founding member of the 
Non-Aligned Movement.
The emergence of the NAM created the “Third World”—a term used to define countries 
that sought to avoid being trapped by the major alliance systems in Europe. This strategy 
of distancing themselves from the bipolar conflict provided these states with the room to 
manipulate that conflict for their own individual and collective aims. It also allowed them 
to bring to the international agenda their concerns about the legacies of colonial rule and 
“underdevelopment” that perpetuated their relative poverty within the international 
political economy. Thus, the NAM served member states as both a device for escaping the 
pressures of the cold war and a framework for coordination on trade and economic issues 
that could become articulated through the United Nations and other international 
organizations. For newly independent states which had limited economic and military 
resources, the NAM was a mechanism for enhancing their autonomy vis-à-vis the major 
military alliances, a diplomatic tool to advance the goals of national self-determination 
and economic development, and a forum for legitimizing the idea of ideological pluralism 
as a counter to the competing theologies of communism and capitalism. The fact that the 
largest Asian states were represented at the Bandung Conference was a powerful 
statement of the ideological (and religious) pluralism that shaped the Third World 
challenge to the agendas of the major European alliances. As a consequence, by the 
mid-1950s the process of decolonization in Asia had begun to reshape the contours of the 
international system and to establish limits upon the capacity of the major powers to 
enforce ideological conformity.
(p. 474) 
16
17
This challenge to ideological conformity represented by the NAM also had an enormous 
impact upon the relationships among the major powers. In the wake of the Soviet Union's 
successful launch of its Sputnik satellites, signaling the sophistication of its space 
exploration technology and its development of an intercontinental-range ballistic missile 
(ICBM) launch system, the United States and the Soviet Union began to explore the 
possibilities of détente in an effort to negotiate mechanisms for stabilizing their 
relationship and limiting the possibility of nuclear war. The development of 
intercontinental nuclear missiles elevated the status and power of both the United States 
and the Soviet Union. In 1956 both had been motivated to use their considerable leverage 
to “limit” the autonomy of their alliance partners. The Hungarian challenge to Soviet 
orthodoxy in 1956 had resulted in a Soviet-led invasion and the installation of a loyal 
regime in Budapest. Simultaneously, Britain, France, and Israel had invaded Egypt in an 
effort to seize control over the Suez Canal, which had been nationalized by the Egyptian 
government led by Gamal Abdel Nasser.  Soviet support for Nasser's nationalization 
policy, as well as its willingness to supply Egypt with arms and financing for the Aswan 
Dam project, had helped to trigger the actions by Britain, France, and Israel. The 
Eisenhower administration used its economic leverage and its influence at the United 
Nations to force the withdrawal of its partners from Egyptian territory and accept 
Nasser's nationalization policy.
Each superpower demonstrated the limits of its willingness to accord autonomy 
to its alliance partners. For the Soviets, ideological orthodoxy was a primary concern in 
maintaining their control over the Warsaw Pact, and their determination to prevent the 
emergence of another Yugoslavia in Eastern Europe was manifest in their intervention in 
Hungary. For the United States, Eisenhower was signaling America's willingness to 
support non-European nationalism for reasons of grand strategy in limiting the expansion 
of Soviet influence in the non-European world even if it required humiliating its NATO 
partners, As the Dutch had discovered in Indonesia, the United States was prepared to 
concede political independence to nationalists in the non-European world if required to 
“contain” communism. In the Suez crisis and the Hungarian uprising, actions by allies of 
the superpowers had escalated international tensions, and the superpowers pursued 
initiatives that signaled their control of their respective partners. With the emergence of 
ICBM systems on both sides of the iron curtain, the superpowers confronted the dilemma 
of preventing their allies from triggering crises that could precipitate escalation of 
conflicts because of treaty commitments. The cold war had crossed a critical threshold.
Several of America's partners in NATO were colonial powers, and this was a matter of 
concern as the growth of nationalism and decolonization in the non-European world 
gained momentum. In 1962, the increasing Cuban-American antipathy that followed upon 
the Cuban revolution in 1959 and the American-backed Bay of Pigs invasion aimed at 
toppling the revolutionary regime was a trigger for the major post-1945 superpower 
confrontation over non- European nationalism. While Cuba was no longer an American 
colony in constitutional terms, the American military base at Guantanamo and American 
investment in Cuba had compromised Cuban sovereignty since the end of the American 
occupation in 1903. The Soviet decision to deploy nuclear missiles, and the threat of a 
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major confrontation between the two nuclear powers over the issue, provided a stark 
glimpse into the possibilities which could result from unrestrained competition between 
the two major alliances over their influence in the non- European world.  The increasing 
globalization of the decolonization process—spreading from Asia to Africa and thence to 
the Caribbean—had undermined the ability of the superpowers to assert control over the 
international order.
As the Suez crisis likewise demonstrated, the United States and its European partners 
diverged on the issue of decolonization as a symptom of the relative decline of the 
influence of the European colonial powers in the international system. The process of 
decline also had a significant impact upon the domestic politics of the colonial powers. 
Great Britain's prime minister in 1956, Anthony Eden, resigned and departed from 
politics, opening the way for a new generation of political leaders. In 1960 his successor, 
Harold Macmillan, delivered his speech on “The Wind of Change” in South Africa, 
acknowledging that the age of European empire was on the wane.  Later that year the 
UN General Assembly passed its Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples which stipulated:
Immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories or all 
other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers 
to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations, 
in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction 
as to race, creed or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete 
independence and freedom.
A similar process of colonial disengagement occurred after France's failures in Vietnam, 
at Suez, and in Algeria. The collapse of French imperial influence led to a loss of 
legitimacy for the Fourth Republic and the return to power of Charles De Gaulle. De 
Gaulle conceded independence to Algeria and decided to negotiate independence for 
France's other African colonies.  More than a decade later, with the collapse of the 
fascist-era Estado Novo regime under Marcelo Caetano in Portugal, the successor regime 
in Lisbon divested the country of its colonies in Africa.  As the individual European 
empires in the non-European world disintegrated, the project aimed at deepening and 
widening the integration of the European states gained momentum. European integration 
provided a focus for the energies of European leaders who sought to have the continent 
remain a major player in international politics. Decolonization was a catalyst for 
increasing pluralism in the international order. As a consequence, the former imperial 
powers sought to forge bonds that would allow the continent to compete more effectively 
with the superpowers. They even became part of the search for ways to limit the capacity 
of the superpowers to define the limits of sovereignty.  A major step in this direction 
began under the Willy Brandt government in West Germany with the adoption of
Ostpolitik, a policy intended to create alternative forms of constructive engagement 
across the iron curtain.  The search for sovereignty that underpinned the decolonization 
process in the non-European world opened the way for the search for a new European 
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order that would revive Europe after the tragedies of two world wars and the division of 
Europe into competing ideological and military blocs.
As Anthony Hopkins argues, the decolonization process also triggered a recalibration of 
the relationship between Britain and its colonies in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and 
South Africa, which had become self-governing dominions with considerable prerogatives 
in domestic and foreign policies. During the cold war, these former colonies moved to 
reshape the constitutional relationship with Britain to expand the scope of their 
sovereignty and to develop greater latitude in foreign policy.  This search for enhanced 
sovereignty among these former colonies revealed the centrality of nationalism in 
reshaping the post-1945 international order even as the superpowers had sought to 
secure greater control over the international order. Of considerable importance in this 
process was the way in which these former British colonies became increasingly tied to 
the global strategy of the United States and the Anglo-American alliance. While Canada 
was a member of NATO, the others were not—yet they emerged as strategic partners for 
both Great Britain and the United States in the Asia-Pacific, the South Atlantic, and 
Indian Ocean regions. This redefinition of the imperial connection among the former 
British colonies and the creation of a new alliance system among the “Anglo-Saxon” 
countries were indicative of subtle shifts in the international political order triggered by 
the cold war's decolonization process.
The expansion of American influence by way of American penetration of the 
European empires and, on occasion, for the displacement of the colonial powers’ 
influence in specific colonies during and after the transfer of power paved the way for the 
United States to redefine the priorities of the various countries. One early example of this 
process was the creation of Israel in part of the Palestine Mandate. The Truman 
administration's recognition of Israeli independence in 1948 opened the way for 
American influence to expand in the country over succeeding decades; British influence 
became increasingly marginal.  America's role in South Vietnam followed a similar path 
until the unification of the country by the Vietnamese communist forces in 1975.  An 
analogous process occurred in the Belgian Congo, which became an American client state 
in Central Africa after its independence from Belgium amid a protracted violent struggle 
among the country's political factions.  This process of American displacement of British 
influence during the decolonization process was also evident in British Guiana during the 
country's struggle for independence.  The expansion of American influence in parts of 
the non-European world resulted in the transformation of formal European colonial rule 
into informal American empire.
The case of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean suggests how the pursuit of American 
strategic goals also subverted and delayed the process of decolonization. In 1971 the 
American government leased Diego Garcia from the British government. As part of the 
arrangement, the British systematically removed and relocated the indigenous people of 
the islands in order to facilitate the American occupation. In return, the United Kingdom 
received American-subsidized Polaris submarine-launched nuclear missiles from the 
United States to support its goal of becoming a military nuclear power.  Diego Garcia 
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illustrates that the continuation of European colonial rule facilitated the expansion of 
American containment strategy in a global context. Some colonies were trapped by the 
imperatives of the cold war conflict, which provided the communist states with the 
opportunity to pillory the Western alliance for perpetuating colonial rule.
In response to the American integration of the European colonies and ex-colonies in the 
containment of Soviet and PRC influence in the non-European world, the two communist 
states embraced anti-colonialism as a strategy for limiting Western influence. Insurgents 
in Vietnam, Algeria, and Angola among others received military and diplomatic support 
from the communist powers. This support for the decolonization of the European empires, 
and the identification of the United States with the European colonial powers, illustrated 
the ways in which decolonization became an integral factor in the evolution of the cold 
war and the strategic calculus of the superpowers and their respective alliance partners. 
America's perception of itself as a superpower capable of guaranteeing the survival of an 
allied regime in South Vietnam was key to its pursuit of a futile war. In 1975 South 
Vietnam collapsed despite more than two decades of American military and financial 
support.
The longest war of decolonization during the cold war was the terrain of the shifting 
fortunes of the major powers and the recalibration of the relationship among them. The 
People's Republic of China's support for Vietnamese reunification did little to enhance its 
relationship with the Vietnamese Communist party. The two countries fought a brief
war in 1979 and competed for influence in Laos and Cambodia,  The 
reunification of Vietnam likewise exacerbated the Sino-Soviet split as both Vietnam and 
the Soviet Union were clearly interested in containing China and its growing engagement 
with the United States.  The United States found itself increasingly isolated from its 
European allies as it escalated its involvement in Vietnam, and both China and the Soviet 
Union competed for influence over the Vietnamese Communist party, while the latter 
manipulated both in pursuit of its goal of national reunification. The outcome was the 
reorientation of priorities that resulted from the negotiations over ending the war. The 
Soviet Union and the United States moved toward détente, while the United States and 
China opened an era of strategic engagement that would result in increasing 
collaboration between them to contain the growth of Soviet-bloc influence.
If the Vietnam War proved to be a catalyst for the relaxation of cold war tensions by way 
of détente and the US-PRC rapprochement, it was the decolonization of the Portuguese 
empire in Africa that signaled that détente between the superpowers was ephemeral. As 
the Estado Novo regime under Marcel Caetano collapsed in Portugal, the nationalist 
movements in Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique moved to take control of these 
territories. The disintegration of Portuguese rule triggered an effort by the Gerald Ford 
administration to encourage the South African government to intervene in Angola and 
Mozambique. Following South African military intervention in Angola, the Cuban 
government responded to the request by the MPLA faction of the nationalist movement 
for support. Cuban troops routed the South African military forces, and the Soviet Union 
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subsequently provided even greater support for the Cuban military forces in Angola as 
the MPLA sought to consolidate its authority against an insurgency supported by South 
Africa and the United States.
The Cuban military success, and the Soviet decision to support the Cuban effort, reflected 
the shifting strategic balance in the international system. The Soviets displayed an 
unprecedented, and decisive, long distance force-projection capability that was critical in 
accelerating the end of colonial rule in Southern Africa. The demise of Portuguese 
colonialism posed a direct threat to the survival of the apartheid regime in South Africa, 
its control over Namibia, and the white supremacist regime in Rhodesia. The United 
States and the United Kingdom had supported South Africa and Rhodesia in their pursuit 
of policies that systematically deprived the black majority populations of political rights 
and economic opportunities. In 1976 South Africa's military defeat was followed by the 
Soweto uprising, led primarily by students. These protests laid the basis for more than a 
decade of escalating confrontation that eventually produced a democratically elected 
multiracial government in 1994. In 1980 the new country of Zimbabwe emerged after the 
Rhodesian white minority regime was removed through an insurgency and growing 
international pressure.  By 1988 the country of Namibia had achieved its political 
independence as the domestic crisis within South Africa undermined the apartheid 
regime's legitimacy and regional influence.  In Rhodesia-Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South 
Africa, the communist states provided support for the victorious nationalist factions 
against the white supremacist regimes. Decolonization continued to be a catalyst for 
increasing conflict between the superpowers even in an era of détente, and the 
decolonization process in Southern Africa further eroded the influence of NATO and its 
allies as the cold war was coming to an end. The end of apartheid in South Africa and 
Namibia was the ultimate acknowledgment that the politics of white supremacy that had 
underpinned the Euro-American colonial order had been discredited. Soviet-Cuban 
intervention in Southern Africa contributed to the revival of the cold war in the 1980s, 
and the end of the cold war in Europe resulted in the unraveling of the apartheid regime 
in South Africa. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the repeal of apartheid both 
occurred in 1991. These historical convergences in the politics of Europe and Africa in 
the post-1945 era offer useful insights into the ways in which the politics of white 
supremacy and European colonial rule were at the heart of the cold war. For both the 
Eastern and Western blocs, decolonization became a surrogate battlefield in their 
struggle to expand or retain their influence. For the Western alliance, continued colonial 
rule was a critical component of a grand strategy to maintain the pre-eminence of the 
capitalist order at home and abroad. For the communist powers, the end of colonialism 
was an effective strategy for undermining the Western alliance and its historic control 
over the international political economy. Decolonization was integral to the cold war 
confrontation and the struggle for ideological supremacy in the wider world.
However, decolonization also raised salient questions about human equality and 
citizenship within the imperial states. As the legitimacy of white supremacy was 
increasingly questioned in the post-1945 era, the status of colonial subjects within the 
imperial framework forced open new avenues of debate and struggle. As colonial subjects 
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and members of “inferior races” within the colonial dispensation, the inequality of 
citizenship was taken for granted. However, wartime service in the imperial armies by 
colonial subjects, and the postwar challenge to notions of racial supremacy that defined 
the colonial order, raised the issue of whether colonial subjects would be content to 
remain second-class citizens within the imperial project. The rise of the nationalist 
movements in the colonies offered one route to first-class citizenship in a country free of 
colonial rule for many colonial subjects. However, for those interested in seeking 
citizenship within the imperial state, the problem of the color line and the politics of 
citizenship became increasingly contested terrain as the imperial centers struggled with 
the idea that “alien” populations would constitute an indelible part of their post-colonial 
ideas of national community.
Integrating the human “fruits of empire” within the post-colonial North Atlantic context 
has been a fundamental predicament of the post-1945 international order and a 
dimension of the decolonization process that requires exploration by scholars in greater 
depth and breadth across the post-imperial order in Europe, North America, and their 
surrogates in the wider world. Given the population losses in Europe due to war and its 
consequences in the first half of the 20th century, postwar reconstruction through the 
recruitment of labor from the colonies to work in the imperial center increasingly became 
a strategy for addressing the demographic deficit within Europe. In addition, the reliance 
upon military recruits from the colonies during World War II and to support the efforts to 
reassert/maintain colonial rule after 1945 posed the problem of how to deal with 
populations of colonial subjects who sought imperial citizenship as an alternative to 
returning to their places of origin.
For these societies, most of which were democracies in the cold war, integrating 
former colonial and other “alien” subjects as citizens was critical to their creation of an 
alternative to the politics of white supremacy. In this project of integrating “alien” 
populations, the United States had to address its own problem of second-class citizenship 
for African Americans and other minorities in the post-1945 period. As the United States 
sought to exercise leadership in the cold war, it found its credibility challenged by its 
politics of racial inequality and segregation. In 1944 Gunnar Myrdal, with support from 
the Carnegie Corporation, published The American Dilemma, advocating an end to its 
racial regime. It was the first major domestic effort to articulate an alternative to the 
politics of white supremacy in the post-1945 international order.  As the cold war 
intensified, and as the NATO alliance and its championship of democracy as a system of 
government superior to communism was refurbished, the gap between the rhetoric of 
democracy and the reality of an exclusionary politics that targeted “alien” populations 
became a problem that could not be wished away. Further, the Nazi regime provided a 
powerful incentive to find a way out of the morass of ideologies and policies based upon 
the absurdity of “racial supremacy” and its corollary, color-coded citizenship.
In the case of the United States, this search for a vision of citizenship that transcended 
race eventually converged around both its domestic history of color-coded citizenship and 
its own policies as a colonial power. The Brown v. Board of Education decision by the 
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Supreme Court in 1954 invalidated the constitutional sanction of segregated education 
and citizenship. The decision was a major catalyst for the escalating civil rights struggle 
in the United States. Further, Martin Luther King, Jr. and other civil rights leaders pushed 
the process of racial reform that culminated in the passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964 
and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. These acts removed the legal impediments to the 
exercise of citizenship by the historically disadvantaged racial/ethnic groups in the 
United States. As Mary Dudziak argues, the politics of racial reform in the United States 
was driven by the sensitivity of American policymakers to the contradictions of their 
espousal of democracy as superior to communism while continuing segregation.  In the 
post-1945 era, similar problems were faced by other Western democracies, including 
Britain, France, and the Netherlands, which had become a destination for immigrants 
from the former colonies, many of them people of color. These new arrivals were 
responding to political changes in the colonies and the growing demand for labor in 
Europe as a result of the postwar reconstruction process.
However, a little noticed aspect of American domestic political reform during the cold war 
was the transformation of Alaska and Hawaii from colonial possessions into non-
contiguous states in the American union. American colonial rule had become, like 
domestic racial segregation, a liability in the cold war conflict. By undertaking its own 
process of colonial reform, the United States was burnishing its credentials as leader of 
the “Free World.” With the accession of Hawaii and Alaska to statehood, the US provided 
an example of its commitment to ending colonial rule by including its former colonial 
subjects in the American body politic as citizens. The importance of this step was 
underlined by the fact that Hawaii had become a state despite the non-white, multi-ethnic 
identity of the majority of its inhabitants even before the mid-1960s.
A similar strategy was adopted by the Netherlands with regard to its colonies in 
the Caribbean, by France in relation to its own Caribbean and Pacific colonies, and 
Britain for some of its colonies in the Caribbean, which were recognized as lacking the 
economic viability to obtain independence. In the United States similar approaches were 
adapted to Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the Pacific territories, where the 
inhabitants of these territories had representative government based on universal 
suffrage and citizenship but were hostage to limited economic opportunities. These 
former colonies were transformed into units where their inhabitants were citizens but 
with limited economic options and dependent upon the largesse of the imperial country. 
As a consequence, colonial reform did not lead to decolonization in legal terms but rather 
mitigated the perpetuation of a colonial politics of racial disadvantage and color-coded 
citizenship. Just as important, these arrangements made it possible for the inhabitants of 
the dependent territories to migrate to the imperial countries and exercise citizenship 
rights there—effectively creating a shift in the demographic composition of these 
societies and leading them to grapple, like the United States, with the implications of 
multicultural democracy during, and after, the cold war. The American dilemma during 
the cold war became part of a larger problem of equal citizenship within the North 
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Atlantic world and in other areas of the former colonial world. Any area settled by 
Europeans who had displaced indigenous populations during the colonial period, 
including the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and South Africa, had to 
confront the issue of equal citizenship rights for the disadvantaged populations.
As the American civil rights struggle unfolded in 1954 after the landmark Brown v. Board 
of Education decision, the politics of race and equal citizenship within the democracies 
became intimately linked to the issue of decolonization. In a very evocative insight into 
the ways in which these processes were linked, Martin Luther King, Jr. observed in April 
1957—after his return from Ghana's independence celebrations—that:
 . . . Ghana tells us that the forces of the universe are on the side of justice . . . That 
night when I saw that old flag coming down and the new flag coming up, I saw 
something else. That wasn’t just an ephemeral, evanescent event appearing on the 
stage of history, but it was an event with eternal meaning, for it symbolizes 
something. That thing symbolized to me that an old order is passing away and a 
new order is coming into being. An old order of colonialism, of segregation, of 
discrimination is passing away now, and a new order of justice and freedom and 
goodwill is being born.
King's observation was remarkably prescient. He understood the linkages that were 
driving the processes of change in both the United States and in the wider international 
system and recognized that his generation of leadership would play a critical role in that 
transition. Decolonization in Africa became a catalyst for empowering King as a civil 
rights leader who saw African decolonization as a stepping stone for the advancement of 
the African American struggle for full citizenship in the United States. African 
independence, like Gandhi's advocacy of nonviolence in the Indian nationalist struggle, 
offered King valuable insights about the development of a strategy for promoting change 
within the United States.
In the final analysis, decolonization during the cold war was about more than 
either the “end of empire” or the “transfer of power.” It was also about the rethinking of 
the nature of the global order and the role of race and citizenship therein. In very 
fundamental terms, it was a process that was transformative for both the colonies and the 
imperial powers. It also represented the emergence of a global process that was both 
international—as in the relationships among states, and transnational—as in the 
relationships among individuals and groups at the level of sub-national strategies of 
engagement. In addition, decolonization marked a shift in global consciousness from 
notions of racial hierarchy as a fundament of human society to the search for human 
community by transcending race. The study of decolonization as a global process 
featuring a range of actors within multiple arenas provides a multifaceted prism through 
which the post-1945 history of international relations can be reconceptualized. 
Decolonization constituted a constant reminder that the bipolar order pursued after 1945 
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by the superpowers and their alliance partners was never a stable framework for the 
management of international relations.
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